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A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large
asset growth, the terrorist’s first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure con-
straint, the terrorist’s total outcome is positive. With equal attack and defense inefficiencies, when the
terrorist as defender requires his first period outcome to be positive, the attacker eliminates the asset in
the first period when asset growth multiplied with the square roots of the terrorist’s and attacker’s discount
parameters exceed 4/
√
3. This gives maximum conflict in the first period. Growth and the two discount
parameters are strategic complements. The range for the attack inefficiency divided by defense inefficiency, 
which causes negative first period outcome for the terrorist, increases with asset growth. The attacker re-
frains from asset elimination in the first period due to strength (weakness) if the ratio is below (above) the 
range.
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1. Introduction
After Hezbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, Israel launched attacks with 
the stated objective of eliminating Hezbollah presence between Israel’s border with Lebanon and 
the Litani River, 18–25 miles north of the border. Hezbollah, founded in 1982 as an umbrella 
organization of various radical Islamic Shi’ite groups, earned two ministers in the government 
and 14 seats in the 128-member Lebanese Parliament after the 2005 election. Israel believes 
Hezbollah earns financial, military, and political support from Syria and Iran. 
In addition to po-litical activities, Hezbollah is estimated to have a few thousand militants and 
activists. It applies guerilla warfare, operates military capacity such as artillery from caves, 
 
 
 tunnels and basements in southern Lebanon, and has intermingled within the infrastructure of
around 300,000 Lebanese civilians who live south of the Litani River. Israel withdrew from
Lebanon in 2000, and has during 2000–2006 assessed Hezbollah’s military buildup during
these six years.
This case matches the phenomenon analyzed in this article. Hezbollah as the defender pos-
sesses an asset perceived as a threat by Israel. Israel as the attacker assesses whether to attack
the asset today or tomorrow, that is, in the first period, or the second period, or in both periods.
The asset grows from the first to the second period. The attacker is not interested in the asset,
but seeks to eliminate it. The defender chooses the optimal defense in both periods. Results
are generated dependent on the growth rate, different discount parameters for the defender and
attacker, the defense inefficiency, and the attack inefficiency. A conventional static analysis con-
siders the tradeoffs each actor makes between how much to invest to defend or attack the asset at
a given point in time, dependent on the opponent’s investment. This article additionally analyzes
the tradeoffs each actor makes concerning investments through time. Each actor’s investment in
each time period accounts for the same actor’s investment in the other time period, and for the
other actor’s investments in both periods. The tradeoffs are crucially different for the defender
and attacker in the two periods, and depend on the five parameters in sometimes unexpected
ways.
Conflicts are over allocation of assets but also over avoidance of threats. A terrorist possessing
an asset such as a resource stock constitutes a threat which other actors may not willingly accept.
Furthermore, if the terrorist’s asset has growth potential through time, the threat may increase.
The assessment of other actors is whether to ignore or downgrade or eliminate the threat today,
or whether to choose a similar or alternative strategy in the future. Although static conflict theory
is well researched, dynamic conflict theory is analytically challenging (Hirshleifer, 1995, p. 31).
This article contributes to the dynamics of conflict. A defender who may be a terrorist is equipped
with an asset which constitutes a threat to others. An attacker chooses a strategy for how to attack
the asset through time.
Contributions to the dynamics of conflict are rare, but a few examples exist. Applying in-
tertemporal optimization without strategic interaction, Sethi (1979) analyzes a continuous dy-
namic pilfering thief. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) consider two rival groups, each dependent
on a single contested renewable resource. They develop differential time equations where groups
continuously allocate their members between resource harvesting and resource appropriation.
They seek to maximize their income. This gives nonlinear dynamic interaction between con-
flict, the two populations, and the resource. Hausken (2005a) generalizes the model to account
for within-group collective action, different resource stocks and efficiencies of harvesting for the
two groups, and variable decisiveness of fighting between the two groups. Maxwell and Reuveny
(2005) further investigate continuous conflict over renewable natural resources. They find that
Hirshleifer’s (1991) “paradox of power” is self-correcting, and that if production causes damage
to disputed resources, introducing conflict enhances social welfare.
For game theory more generally, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) have shown that “any in-
dividually rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with
sufficiently little discounting.”1 Their result has often been used to show that cooperation rather
than conflict can be sustained in long-term relationships. The prisoner’s dilemma has often been
used for illustration (Axelrod, 1984). For the battle of the sexes where one player values the
future while the other is myopic, Hausken (2005b) shows that the first player is more inclined
through conflictful behavior to risk a conflict in the present when the future is important. Sim-
ilarly, Skaperdas (1996) show how increased importance of the future may harm cooperation.
These mixed results make it quite appropriate to analyze whether a two period growth model
suppresses or amplifies conflict, possibly differently in the two periods.
Whether growth of a terrorist’s asset deters or encourages attack has to the author’s knowledge
not been considered in the literature. The literature on economic growth is by its nature dynamic,
but has not been explicitly linked to conflict. The linkage has instead been made to income
distribution, human capital, fertility, trade development, money, etc. One example of a focus
within this literature, provided by Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), is how the level of wealth
and the degree of inequality affects growth.
The attacker’s decision in an intertemporal conflict model can also be conceptualized as how
to make investment substitutions across time. A large attack in the first period is detrimental to
asset growth and reduces the opportunities for the downgraded defender in the second period.
Conversely, a too modest attack in the first period may also be suboptimal since the defender
may enjoy a too advantaged position in the second period, and constitute a substantial threat to
others. Although substitutions across targets have been analyzed (Hausken, 2006), intertemporal
substitutions against the same target have hardly been analyzed. There are a few examples with a
somewhat different focus. First, Enders and Sandler (2003) suggest that a terrorist may compile
and accumulate resources during times when the defender’s investments are high, awaiting times
when the defender may relax his efforts and choose lower investments. Second, in preventing
terrorism, Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003, pp. 201, 224) show that “the optimal control of terror
stocks will rely on both ongoing abatement and periodic cleanup” of “a terrorist’s ‘stock of terror
capacity’.” Their work is influenced by Arrow et al.’s (1951) and Scarf’s (1960) (S, s) model of
inventory management. The optimal policy in the face of stochastic demand for a product is to
replenish inventory up to a level given by S every time it falls to or below s. These contributions
do not consider a strategic opponent.
Section 2 develops the two-period game. Section 3 solves the game. Section 4 assumes an
expenditure constraint for the defender. Section 5 considers numerical examples and Section 6
concludes.
2. A two-period game
Consider a terrorist, or more generally any collective or individual actor, e.g. a firm, with an
asset R which it seeks to defend. The asset can be thought of as a threat such as a resource
stock of terrorist capacity, but may be anything of value to the terrorist such as its organization,
its possessions, a physical or non-physical commodity, an information set, etc. The terrorist is
under attack by another actor which seeks to destroy the asset, or a largest possible fraction
of it. The other actor finds no value in the terrorist’s asset, but rather considers it as a threat,
does not want to utilize it or transform it for own use, and confines attention to eliminating
1 Defining V ∗ as “the set of individually rational payoffs,” the Folk Theorem states: “For any (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V ∗, if
players discount the future sufficiently little, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game where, for
all i, player i’s average payoff is vi” (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986, p. 537).
it. The other actor may be a government, another terrorist or firm in the same or in another
industry, or more generally any collective or individual actor which lawfully or unlawfully seeks
to destroy the asset. Whether or not this other actor has assets is not under consideration in
this paper. In period i, i = 1,2, the terrorist, referred to as the defender, incurs an effort Ti
to defend his asset, hereafter referred to as an investment. The effort may be hiring competent
personnel such as lawyers, engineers, and security guards, or implementation of procedures to
protect the asset while ensuring that it is available and accessible as the defender requires, or
investment in technology such as physical barriers, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems,
encryption techniques, access control mechanisms, to ascertain that the defense is optimal. The
defense investment expenditure is Fi , where ∂Fi/∂Ti > 0. We consider the simple case Fi =
BTi , where B is the inefficiency of investment. Higher B means greater inefficiency, and 1/B is
the efficiency.2
Independently and simultaneously in period i, the other actor, referred to as the attacker, incurs
an effort ti to destroy the asset. The attacker seeks to be more competent than the lawyers, engi-
neers, and security guards employed by the defender, seeks to circumvent the defense procedures,
and seeks to break through the firewalls, penetrate the intrusion detection systems, encryption
techniques, and access control mechanisms, thus attempting to design the optimal attack. Analo-
gously, the attack investment expenditure is fi , ∂fi/∂ti > 0. We assume fi = bti , where b is the
inefficiency of investment, and 1/b is the efficiency. Both the expenditures BTi and bti can be
capital and/or labor, and both the defender and attacker are assumed risk neutral.3
We assume that the contest between the defender and attacker takes the form that is common in
the conflict and rent seeking literature (Hirshleifer, 1995; Skaperdas, 1996), with one difference.
The defender gets a fraction Hi , and seeks to maximize this fraction. The attacker, in contrast,
seeks to minimize the fraction Hi , and is not concerned about the remaining fraction 1 − Hi , as
in the rent seeking literature, ∂Hi/∂Ti > 0, ∂Hi/∂ti < 0. The fraction Hi can be thought of as an
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where m is a decisiveness parameter.5 The defender’s outcome in period i is Ui , which he seeks
to maximize. The attacker’s outcome in period i is ui , which she seeks to minimize. Based on
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T m1 + tm1
R + bt1. (3)
We subtract the cost expenditure BT1 for the defender, and add the cost expenditure bt1 for the
attacker, since they seek maximization and minimization, respectively. After the contest in the
first period the defender retains the smaller asset RT m1 /(T
m
1 + tm1 ). Defenders are continuously
2 B can also be interpreted as the unit cost of defense investment, where Ti is generally continuous.
3 An alternative analysis may for example assume that the attacker is risk seeking while the defender is risk averse.
Assuming risk neutrality simplifies the analysis. Much of the economic conflict literature related to production, appro-
priation, defense, and rent seeking assumes risk neutrality. See Skaperdas (1991) for an exception.
4 An alternative is the logit or difference form Hi = emti /(emti + emTi ).
5 m = 0 gives equal distribution, and 0 < m < 1 gives a disproportional advantage of investing less than one’s opponent.
When m = 1, the investments have proportional impact, m > 1 gives a disproportional advantage of investing more than
one’s opponent, and m = ∞ implies “winner-takes-all.”
worn down by attackers, especially if attackers are successful, and are often also worn down by
the wear and tear of time. With nothing to counteract this wearing down, the assets of defenders
would gradually become smaller and smaller, and eventually disappear. Usually, defenders of
assets set in motion processes to ensure that assets grow over time. Such growth may be due to
a blossoming economy, discovering and exploiting market opportunities, hard and skillful work,
outside funding, or the benefit of being at the right place at the right time. If an asset is converted
into money and placed in a bank, the asset earns an interest rate. If the asset is invested in the
stock market, dividends may be paid out. Workers and consultants can be employed to grow
assets, and contracts with various actors can be made to ensure further growth. To account for
asset growth from the first period to the second period, we multiply with a growth parameter a.
That is, the defender’s asset RT m1 /(T
m
1 + tm1 ) after the first period grows to aRT m1 /(T m1 + tm1 ) at
the start of the second period. Especially, if a = 1, there is no growth from the first to the second
period. The defender simply starts the second period with the same asset it retained after the
first period. If a > 1, there is positive growth. If 0 < a < 1, the asset deteriorates which means
negative growth. Finally, if a = 0, the asset vanishes, the defender is driven out of business, and
the second period is not worth playing.
In the second period the actors invest analogously as in the first period. Independently and
simultaneously, the defender incurs an effort T2 and the attacker incurs an effort t2. Based on the
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Note that the term aRT m1 /(T
m
1 + tm1 ) is present in both U2 and u2 since this is what is under
attack in the second period.
For the two-period game as a whole, with discounting  for the defender and δ for the attacker
for the second period, the total outcomes U and u for the defender and attacker are
U = U1 + U2, u = u1 + δu2. (5)
If the attacker does not attack in any of the periods, and the defender keeps her resource in both
periods, the outcomes are U = (1 + a)R to the defender and u = (1 + δa)R to the attacker.
Conversely, if the defender gives up her asset without defense, the attacker invests arbitrarily
little and both actors’ outcomes are zero U = u = 0.
3. Solving the two-period game
The game is solved with backward recursion, starting with the second period, assuming a
subgame perfect equilibrium. We thereafter find the optimal solution in the first period, taking
into account that the actors’ choices in the second period must be in equilibrium. Differentiating
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Intuitively, the ratio T2/t2 of the investments in the second period is inverse proportional to the
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When a = 0, or b = 0, or  = 0 and δ = 0, which means zero growth, or zero attack inefficiency,
or discount parameters equal to zero for both actors, the total outcomes for the two-period game
in (7) equal the outcomes U1 and u1 in (3) for the first period. The second term in each of
the two brackets in (7), multiplied with the factor outside each bracket, express the additional
outcomes the defender and attacker get in the second period. These two terms depend on the
three parameters a, b, B . Additionally, for the defender it depends on , and for the attacker it
depends on δ. The asset R operates proportionally outside the brackets. Differentiating (7), and
solving the first order conditions ∂U/∂T1 = 0 and ∂u/∂t1 = 0 gives
T1 = b[(B + b)
2 + δab(2B + b)][(B + b)2 + ab2]2
(B + b)2[B3 + Bb2(3 + δa) + B2b(3 + 2δa) + b3(1 + a)]2 R,
t1 = B[(B + b)
2 + δab(2B + b)]2[(B + b)2 + ab2]
(B + b)2[B3 + Bb2(3 + δa) + B2b(3 + 2δa) + b3(1 + a)]2 R. (8)
The denominators in T1 and t1 are equivalent. The two brackets in the numerators in T1 and t1
are also equivalent, but oppositely squared.
Inserting a = 0 or  = δ = 0 into (8) and (3) when m = 1 gives
T1 = bR
(B + b)2 , t1 =
BT1
b
, U1 = b
2R
(B + b)2 , u1 =
b(2B + b)R
(B + b)2 . (9)
When a = 0 or  = δ = 0, the first period effectively operates as the second and last period. The
ratio T1/t1 of the investments is then inverse proportional to the ratio B/b of the inefficiencies,
as is generally the case in the second period shown in (6). Inserting b = B into (9) gives
T1 = t1 = R4B , U1 = U =
R
4
, u1 = u = 3R4 . (10)
Hence when equally matched b = B , and no growth a = 0 or  = δ = 0, each actor gets 50% of
the asset. Both actors’ investment expenditures are 14 of the asset R. Hence the defender keeps
1
4 of her asset. The attacker adds the expenditures
1
4 to 50% of the asset value and gets the
outcome 34 which he seeks to minimize.
Inserting (8) into (6) for m = 1 gives
T2 = ab
2[(B + b)2 + ab2]





Inserting the first and second period investments in (8) and (11) into (3)–(5) gives the out-
comes6
U1 = b
2R((b + B)2 + ab2)((b + B)4 − ab(−(b − B)(b + B)2 + abB(b + 2B)δ))
(b + B)2(B3 + b2B(3 + aδ) + bB2(3 + 2aδ) + b3(1 + a))2 ,
u1 = bR((b + B)
2 + ab2)((b + 2B)((b + B)4 + 3abB(b + B)2δ + a2b2B(b + 2B)δ2) + ab3(b + B)2)
(b + B)2(B3 + b2B(3 + aδ) + bB2(3 + 2aδ) + b3(1 + a))2 ,
6 All calculations in this article are made using the Mathematica software package (http://www.wolfram.com).
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3R((b + B)2 + ab2)
(b + B)2(B3 + b2B(3 + aδ) + bB2(3 + 2aδ) + b3(1 + a)) ,








2(b + 2B)R((b + B)2 + ab2)
(b + B)2(B3 + b2B(3 + aδ) + bB2(3 + 2aδ) + b3(1 + a)) ,
U = b
2R((b + B)2 + ab2)3
(b + B)2(B3 + b2B(3 + aδ) + bB2(3 + 2aδ) + b3(1 + a))2 ,
u = bR((b + B)
2 + ab(b + 2B)δ)((b + B)2 + ab2)((b + 2B)((b + B)2 + 2abBδ) + ab3)
(b + B)2(B3 + b2B(3 + aδ) + bB2(3 + 2aδ) + b3(1 + a))2 .
(12)
Proposition 1.
(i) With no first period outcome restraint for the defender, an interior solution with positive first





















Proof. Follows from (8), (11), U1 in (12), and Appendix A. 
Since the attacker seeks to eliminate the asset, she always attacks in the first period, causing
a need for the defender to defend his asset unless he is constrained by his first period outcome
which can be low or negative. The second period is the last period. The defender seeks to defend
his asset, and the attacker seeks to eliminate it.
Both actors’ second period investments increase with growth, and increase as the defender’s
discount parameter increases. A growing asset is important to defend, and more so if the second
period is important for the defender. The attacker responds with increased investment in the
second period. The defender also invests more to defend the asset in the first period if the second
period is important for him as expressed with a large discount parameter.
The defender invests more in the first period if her discount parameter is large. If the second
period is important for the defender, she invests more in the first period to downgrade the asset.
Both actors’ second period investments decrease as the attacker’s discount parameter increases.
Finally, the defender’s first period investment decreases with the defense inefficiency, since the
defender is thereby place in a disadvantaged position and is induced to invest less.
We define Ui/Ti as the rate of return on investment for the defender in period i. Outcome
is interpreted as return for the defender. In the second period, the rate is b, as shown in (12).
Intuitively, the defender’s rate of return increases if the attack inefficiency increases, which is to
the detriment of the attacker. When a = 0 or  = δ = 0, the first period effectively operates as
the last period, giving U1/T1 = b.
All the six outcomes in (12) are positive except U1 where the requirement is
U1 > 0 when a <
2(b + B)2
b(B − b) + √b√4B(b + 2B)δ + (b − B)2 = a
∗. (13)
Proposition 2.
(i) With no expenditure constraint for the defender, his total outcome and second period out-
come are always positive, though may be less worth than the asset R he started out with.
(ii) The defender’s first period outcome is positive when a < a∗ defined in (13).
(iii) With expenditure constraint U1 > 0 for the defender, he loses his entire asset in the first
period when a > a∗, after which the game ends. This constitutes maximum conflict in the
first period.



































Proof. Follows from (12), (13) and Appendix A. 
If asset growth is too large as expressed in (13), a > a∗, the defender’s first period outcome is
negative. This is detrimental for the defender if he is subject to the expenditure constraint such as
U1 > 0, or U1 > k where k is positive or negative, which he very well may be, since he then loses
his entire asset through elimination by the attacker. The reason is that the defender chooses zero
first period investment T1 = 0 which guarantees zero outcome rather than negative outcome in the
first period. The defender is in a preferred situation if subject to no expenditure constraint. Then
his total outcome is always positive, regardless of growth and the other parameters. The reason
is that the positive second period outcome more than compensates for the possibly negative first
period outcome. This causes a positive total outcome which, though, may be less worth than the
resource R the defender started out with.
Increasing growth and an increasing discount parameter for the defender gives an increasing
second period outcome for the defender, and increasing second period and total outcomes for the
attacker, who is disadvantaged by both growth and that the defender values the future. Also, the
defender’s total outcome increases as his discount parameter increases. In contrast, the defender’s
second period and total outcome decreases as the attacker’s discount parameter increases. The
attacker’s second period outcome also decreases as the attacker’s discount parameter increases,
which is to the advantage of the defender. However, the attacker’s total outcome increases as the
attacker’s discount parameter increases. The defender’s total outcome decreases with the defense
inefficiency, which is to his disadvantage. Both the defender’s and attacker’s second period and
total outcome increase with the attack inefficiency since such increase is to the advantage of the
defender and disadvantage of the attacker.
Proposition 3 (Strategic complementarity).
(i) For the first period investments and outcomes T1, t1, U1, u1, and the total outcomes U and u,
growth never operates alone but is always a strategic complement with either the defender’s
discount parameter, expressed as a, or a strategic complement with the attacker’s discount
parameter, expressed as δa.
(ii) For the second period investments and outcomes T2, t2, U2, u2, growth is a strategic com-
plement, but also operates once proportionally alone.
Proof. Follows from (8), (11), (12). 
Growth is the most essential parameter with largest flexibility. However, reduced (increased)
growth can be compensated by higher (lower) discount parameters, with the constraint that dis-
count parameters are between zero and one.
4. Expenditure constraint U1 > k for the defender
The defender may for a variety of reasons not have the capacity or willingness to accept
low or negative outcome U1 < k in the first period, where k is positive or negative, despite
the possibility of a positive total outcome U > 0. When the defender is a terrorist, operating
outside the broadly accepted social norms of society, outside the legal structures and commonly
used financial systems, and usually hidden from society at large, additional risk plays a role.
The terrorist may have funders of various kinds, but not necessarily funders who accept low or
negative outcomes at various points in time. Note that U1 < k can be a lenient or strict constraint.
As expressed in (3), it means that the cost expenditure BT1 the defender incurs in the first period
cannot be too large compared with the fraction RT m1 /(T
m
1 + tm1 ) it retains of the asset R it
originally possessed. When k = 0, the former cannot exceed the latter. A defender’s constraint
may be quite strict, expressed with a positive k. With few own resources, and few sponsors and
benefactors, a defender may only be able to sustain a cost expenditure that is a small part of the
fraction of R it expects to retain. A good benchmark for analysis is to assume an expenditure
constraint that equals what one expects to possess after a contest, which means k = 0. A bank,
for example, may be unwilling to give a loan that exceeds the net worth of the customer. This
section analyzes the implications of requiring U1 > k for the defender in the first period, where
k = 0 is a convenient benchmark.
Inserting equal attack and defense inefficiencies b = B into (8) and (12) gives
T1 = (4 + 3δa)(4 + a)
2
4B[8 + (3δ + )a]2 R, t1 =
(4 + 3δa)2(4 + a)
4B[8 + (3δ + )a]2 R,
u1 = [48 + 9δa(4 + δa) + 4a](4 + a)4[8 + (3δ + )a]2 R,
U1 = (16 − 3δa
2)(4 + a)
4[8 + (3δ + )a]2 R > 0 when a < 4/
√
3δ ⇔ a√δ < 4/√3,
T2 = t2 = a(4 + a)4B[8 + (3δ + )a]R, U2 = bT2 =
a(4 + a)
4[8 + (3δ + )a]R,
u2 = 3U2 = 3a(4 + a)4[8 + (3δ + )a]R,
U = (4 + a)
3
4[8 + (3δ + )a]2 R, u =
[12 + (6δ + )a](4 + 3δa)(4 + a)
4[8 + (3δ + )a]2 R. (14)
Proposition 4. Assume expenditure constraint U1 > k for the defender and equal attack and
defense inefficiencies b = B .
(i) The attacker eliminates the entire asset in the first period when k = 0 and a > 4/√3δ.
(ii) The attacker eliminates the entire asset in the first period when k is arbitrarily much neg-
ative and finite provided that growth a is sufficiently large. Lima→∞ U1 = −∞. All other
variables approach infinity as a approaches infinity.
(iii) When k = 0, growth and the two discount parameters are strategic complements, a√δ >
4/
√
3, where the impact of each discount parameter is the square root of the impact of
growth.
Fig. 1. The defender’s first period outcome U1 as a function of b/B ,  = δ = 4/5.
Proof. (i) Follows from setting U1 > 0 in (14). (ii) The variables T1, t1, U1, u1, U , u in (14) are
of the third order in a in the numerator, and in the second order in a in the denominator. The
variables T2, t2, U2, u2 in (14) are of the second order in a in the numerator, and in the first order
in a in the denominator. (iii) Follows from (14). 
If the attacker seeks to eliminate the entire asset in the first period, she is aided by large growth
of the defender’s asset, but also aided by both the defender’s and attacker’s discount parameters.
Analyzing the impact of different attack and defense inefficiencies b and B is complicated
since setting U1 = 0 in (12) and (13) gives a fourth order equation in both b and B . Fig. 1 plots
the defender’s first period outcome 100U1/R as a function of b/B when  = δ = 4/5, for three
growth values. Multiplication with 100 is for scaling purposes, and all variables are proportional
to R. Inserting into Proposition 4 gives a > 5/
√
3 as a requirement for asset elimination when
b/B = 1. Accordingly, the middle curve (star) sets a = 5/√3 ≈ 2.89 which causes U1 = 0 when
b/B = 1. When the attack inefficiency increases above one, to the disadvantage of the attacker,
U1 is positive and the asset is not eliminated in the first period. The attacker is too disadvantaged
to do so. The attacker prefers not to eliminate the asset due to weakness. Conversely, when the
attack inefficiency decreases below one, to the advantage of the attacker, U1 is negative and
the asset is not eliminated in the first period. But this holds only when 0.65 < b/B < 1. When
b/B < 0.65, U1 is positive with no asset elimination in the first period. The reason is that the
attacker is so advantaged by a low b/B that there is no reason to incur the extreme expenditure of
eliminating the asset entirely in the first period. The attacker prefers not to eliminate the asset due
to strength. The attacker is also advantaged by a low b/B in the second period, and the tradeoff
across time involves optimal asset reduction in both periods.
The first curve (box) in Fig. 1 chooses lower growth a = 0.9 ∗ 5/√3 ≈ 2.60 which causes
U1 > 0. There is less need for the attacker to eliminate the asset in the first period when the asset
grows modestly into the second period. The third curve (triangle) in Fig. 1 chooses higher growth
a = 1.1 ∗ 5/√3 ≈ 3.18 which causes U1 > 0 when b/B > 1.49. The substantial asset growth
causes a threat leading to its first period elimination also within the range 1 < b/B < 1.49,
where the attacker is up to 49% more disadvantaged than the defender by her attack inefficiency.
When b/B > 1.49, the attacker is too disadvantaged to eliminate the asset in the first period.
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At the lower end, when b/B < 0.43, the asset is not eliminated in the first period due to strength
since it is expenditure efficient for the advantaged attacker to reduce the asset in both periods.
Note that 0.43 for the third curve is lower than 0.65 for the second curve because of the higher
asset growth for the third curve. When asset growth is large, the attacker needs to be advantaged
by an even lower b/B in order to refrain from eliminating the asset in the first period due to
strength.
Fig. 2 makes the same assumptions as Fig. 1, but increases both actors’ discount parameters
to  = δ = 1. Because of strategic complementarity, increasing the discount parameters has an
impact similar to increasing growth. Consequently, the intermediate range of b/B within which
the asset is eliminated in the first period increases.
Proposition 5. U1 increases concavely from zero when b/B = 0. When growth is large enough,
expressed as a > 4/
√
3δ when b/B = 1, U1 reaches a maximum, decreases, becomes negative
for a range of b/B which includes b/B = 1, reaches a minimum, increases, becomes positive,
and increases concavely toward R. Hence with large growth, the attacker chooses to eliminate
the defender’s asset in the first period within an intermediate range of b/B which includes
b/B = 1. When b/B is above this range, the defender refrains from asset elimination in the
first period due to weakness. When b/B is below this range, the defender refrains from asset
elimination in the first period due to strength.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 5 throws light on Israel’s strategy towards Hezbollah in the early years of the
New Millennium. From 2000 until July 12, 2006 Israel refrained from attacking Hezbollah due
to own strength. The growth a of Hezbollah’s attack capacity was perceived not to be too high,
b/B was low, and Hezbollah earned a positive first period outcome U1. Israel perceived its own
military superiority to be so significant that it tolerated Hezbollah’s presence near its northern
border. This situation is illustrated with the first curve (box) in Fig. 1 where b/B is low and
U1 is positive. Gradually, two mechanisms started to operate. The first was that Israel perceived
Hezbollah’s growth a to increase. Its support in southern Lebanon increased. Its military strength
increased helped by perceived funding by other actors. And its threat became more overwhelm-
ing as perceived by Israel. The second mechanism was that Israel perceived Hezbollah’s defense
inefficiency B to decrease, which means lower unit cost of investing Ti . If b is constant, this
causes b/B to increase. Referring to Fig. 1, these two mechanisms cause a downward vertical
shift in U1 because of increasing growth a, and a rightward horizontal shift in U1 because of
decreasing inefficiency B . This situation is illustrated with the second and third curves (star, tri-
angle) in Fig. 1 where U1 is negative. That is, the inevitable consequence is that Hezbollah’s first
period outcome U1 gets decreased too much due to heavy attacks by Israel seeking to eliminate
Hezbollah’s attack capacity. In situations like this, which are quite common, the strategic deci-
sion by defenders such as Hezbollah is whether and how long it is willing or capable to sustain
a low and possibly negative first period outcome U1. A defender without such willingness or
capability gets eliminated. A defender that perseveres and accepts a low or negative U1 through
time, may earn a reputation for standing up against an adversary which, combined with other
advantages may cause a positive second period outcome and a positive total outcome in the long
run.
5. Numerical examples
Assume R = 100, B = 1, and  = δ = 4/5 and consider four benchmarks. First, if the attacker
does not attack in any of the periods, and the defender keeps her resource untouched in both
periods, the outcomes are U = u = 100 + 80a which increases from 100 to infinity when a
increases from 0 to infinity. The defender seeks to maximize her outcome U and the attacker
seeks to minimize his outcome u. Second, if the defender gives up her asset without defense, the
attacker invests arbitrarily little and both actors’ outcomes are zero U = u = 0. Third, and moving
now to equilibrium situations, if the actors are equally matched b = B = 1 and no growth a = 0,
(10) gives T1 = t1 = U1 = U = 25 and u1 = u = 75. Fourth, with infinite growth a = ∞, then
U1 = −∞ and all other variables are infinite. Table 1 considers 15 numerical examples where
we use the growth values a = 5/√3 ≈ 2.89, a = 0.9 ∗ 5/√3 ≈ 2.60, and a = 1.1 ∗ 5/√3 ≈ 3.18
from Fig. 1, and allow the attack inefficiency b to vary.
Table 1
The 10 variables dependent on a and b when R = 100, B = 1,  = δ = 4/5
a b T1 t1 T2 t2 U1 u1 U2 u2 U u
2.60 0.2 10.72 82.93 4.13 20.69 0.73 28.04 0.83 9.09 1.39 35.32
2.89 0.2 10.50 84.11 4.45 22.24 0.60 27.92 0.89 9.79 1.31 35.74
3.18 0.2 10.28 85.26 4.74 23.72 0.48 27.81 0.95 10.44 1.24 36.16
4.65 0.2 9.36 90.64 6.044 30.22 0 27.49 1.21 13.30 0.97 38.13
0 1 25 25 0 0 25 75 0 0 25 75
1 1 29.39 39.18 10.71 10.71 13.47 82.04 10.71 32.14 22.04 107.76
2.60 1 35.52 59.82 24.20 24.20 1.74 97.08 24.20 72.60 21.10 155.16
2.89 1 36.60 63.40 26.42 26.42 0 100. 26.42 79.25 21.13 163.40
3.18 1 37.68 66.95 28.59 28.59 −1.67 102.96 28.59 85.77 21.21 171.57
5 1 44.44 88.89 41.67 41.67 −11.11 122.22 41.67 125 22.22 222.22
∞ b ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ −∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
2.60 2 47.02 34.80 33.18 16.59 10.45 127.07 66.36 132.72 63.53 233.24
2.89 2 49.67 37.40 36.59 18.29 7.38 131.85 73.18 146.36 65.92 248.93
3.18 2 52.28 40.01 39.98 19.99 4.37 136.67 79.95 159.91 68.33 264.59
3.60 2 56.16 43.84 44.95 22.48 0 143.85 89.90 179.80 71.92 287.69
Consider the defender’s first period outcome when the actors are equally matched b = B = 1.
When a = 1, both actors invest more in the first period than in the second period, and the first
period outcomes are somewhat higher than the second period outcomes. If the defender requires a
first period outcome of U1  13.47, growth cannot exceed a = 1. If it does, she withdraws in the
first period with outcome T1 = U1 = T2 = U2 = U = 0. As a exceeds 2.89, the defender’s first
period outcome is negative. It is U1 = −1.67 when a = 3.18. If the defender can sustain that, her
second period outcome and total outcome are U2 = 28.59 and U = 21.21. The outcome is U1 =
−11.11 when a = 5. With infinite growth, she can sustain a negative infinite first period outcome
which gets compensated with a positive infinite second period outcome and total outcome.
The four first rows in Table 1 gives a five-fold advantage to the attacker in terms of b = 0.2.
This corresponds to a leftward shift in Fig. 1. The defender’s first period outcomes are small,
but they are all positive. The defender’s second period outcomes are also small. The attacker
perceives the defender as a small nuisance and refrains from eliminating the asset due to own
strength expressed with the low b. Growth a = 4.65 is needed to reduce the defender’s first
period outcome to U1 = 0 in equilibrium. A higher first period investment by the attacker is
not worth wile, and a lower investment allows the asset to be slightly more than a nuisance in
the second period. For this example the defender’s total outcome decreases from U = 1.39 to
U = 0.97 as growth increases from a = 2.60 to a = 4.65.
The four last rows in the table gives a two-fold disadvantage to the attacker in terms of b = 2.
This corresponds to a rightward shift in Fig. 1. The defender’s first period outcomes are larger
and all positive. The defender’s second period outcomes are even larger. The attacker perceives
the defender as an overwhelming threat and refrains from eliminating the asset due to own weak-
ness expressed with the high b. Growth a = 3.60 is needed to reduce the defender’s first period
outcome to U1 = 0 in equilibrium. A higher first period investment by the attacker is too costly,
and a lower investment allows the asset to be unacceptably large in the second period. For this ex-
ample the defender’s total outcome increases from U = 63.53 to U = 71.92 as growth increases
from a = 2.60 to a = 3.60.
6. Conclusion
A defender who may be a terrorist possesses an asset perceived as a threat by an attacker who
seeks to downgrade or eliminate it. A contest success function determines the relative fraction
retained by the defender in each of two periods. The fraction may grow from the first to the
second period. The attacker seeks to minimize the defender’s fraction of the asset through time.
With no first period outcome restraint for the defender, an interior solution with positive first
period and second period investments for the defender and attacker always exists. Since the
attacker seeks to eliminate the asset, she always attacks in the first period, causing a need for the
defender to defend the asset. Both actors’ second period investments increase with asset growth,
and increase as the defender’s discount parameter increases. A growing asset is important to
defend, and more so if the second period is important for the defender.
With no expenditure constraint for the defender, his second period outcome and total outcome
are always positive, though may be less worth than his initial asset. The defender’s first period
outcome is positive when his asset growth is moderate since he constitutes no formidable threat.
A defender with large asset growth is guaranteed a first period low or negative income when the
ratio of the attack and defense inefficiencies is intermediate within a certain range. If the defender
does not accept a low or negative first period outcome, his asset is eliminated and the game ends.
This constitutes maximum conflict in the first period. The defender is in a preferred situation
if subject to no expenditure constraint. Then his total outcome is always positive, regardless of
growth and the other parameters. The reason is that the positive second period outcome more
than compensates for the possibly negative first period outcome.
Increasing growth and an increasing discount parameter for the defender gives an increasing
second period outcome for the defender, and increasing second period and total outcomes for
the attacker, who is disadvantaged by both growth and that the defender values the future. The
defender’s total outcome increases as his discount parameter increases. In contrast, the defender’s
second period and total outcome decrease as the attacker’s discount parameter increases. The
attacker’s second period outcome also decreases as the attacker’s discount parameter increases,
which is to the advantage of the defender. However, the attacker’s total outcome increases as the
attacker’s discount parameter increases. The defender’s total outcome decreases with the defense
inefficiency, which is to his disadvantage. Both the defender’s and attacker’s second period and
total outcome increase with the attack inefficiency since such increase is to the advantage of the
defender and disadvantage of the attacker.
Growth and the two discount parameters are strategic complements. The growth parameter has
the largest flexibility. Reduced (increased) growth can be compensated by higher (lower) discount
parameters, though discount parameters are constrained between zero and one. For the first period
investments and outcomes, and the total outcomes, growth never operates alone but is always a
strategic complement with either the defender’s discount parameter or the attacker’s discount
parameter. For the second period investments and outcomes, growth is a strategic complement,
but also operates once proportionally alone. If the attacker seeks to eliminate the entire asset in
the first period, she is aided by large growth of the defender’s asset, but also aided by both the
defender’s and attacker’s discount parameters.
Assume that the defender requires his first period outcome to be positive, which means that
his cost expenditure of investment in the first period cannot exceed the fraction of the asset that
he retains after the contest in the first period. Then, with equal attack and defense inefficiencies,
the attacker eliminates the entire asset in the first period when the asset growth multiplied with
the square roots of the defender’s and attacker’s discount parameters exceed 4/
√
3. Hence when
both discount parameters equal one, the attacker eliminates assets that grow more than 131%.
The range for the ratio of the attack and defense inefficiencies, which causes negative first
period outcome for the defender, increases both upwards and downwards with increasing asset
growth. The range is finite and bounded strictly above zero. Interestingly, the attacker refrains
from asset elimination in the first period due to weakness if the ratio is above the range, or due
to strength if the ratio is below the range. First, if the attack inefficiency is too large, the attacker
refrains from asset elimination due to weakness. With infinitely large attack inefficiency, the
defender keeps his entire asset in the first period and may become a substantial threat in the
second period due to asset growth. Second, and conversely, if the attack inefficiency is too low,
the attacker refrains from asset elimination due to strength. She may degrade the asset somewhat,
but knows that her superiority is overwhelming and finds it optimal to downgrade the asset in both
periods. She may attack moderately today, moderately tomorrow, but always has the option of
eliminating the asset if it grows out of bounds.
The model is illustrated with Israel’s strategy towards Hezbollah. From 2000 until July 12,
2006 Israel refrained from attacking Hezbollah due to own strength. Gradually, Hezbollah’s asset
growth increased, and its defense inefficiency decreased. This caused Israel to launch a large first
period attack which reduced Hezbollah’s first period outcome. Defenders without willingness or
capability to sustain low or negative first period outcomes get eliminated. In contrast, defenders
with such willingness or capability may persevere through asset growth and compensation in the
second period.
Appendix A. Proof of propositions
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Proof of Proposition 5. Inserting s = b/B into the first equation in (12) gives
U1 = s
2R((1 + s)4 + as((s − 1)(1 + s)2 − as(2 + s)δ))(1 + s(2 + s + as))
(1 + s)2(1 + s(3 + 2aδ + s(3 + s + aδ + as)))2 . (A1)
Applying L’Hopital’s rule eight times on the numerator and denominator gives
Lim
b/B→∞U1 = R (A2)
so the defender keeps his entire resource at the limit when the ratio of the attack and defense
inefficiencies approaches infinity, independently of growth. Also, inserting s = b/B = 0 into
(A1) gives
Lim
b/B→0U1 = 0 (A3)
so the defender loses his entire resource at the limit when the ratio of the attack and defense











= 2R > 0 (A4)
show that U1 increases concavely in b/B when b/B = 0. Hence U1 is positive when b/B is
arbitrarily small but positive. However, we know from (14) where b/B = 1 that growth can be
chosen large enough, a > 4/
√
3δ, such that U1 is negative, U1 < 0. Finally, we know from (A2)
that U1 reaches R asymptotically and thus concavely as b/B approaches infinity, independently
of growth. In other words, U1 increases concavely from zero when b/B = 0. When growth is
large enough, U1 reaches a maximum, decreases, becomes negative for a range of b/B which
includes b/B = 1, reaches a minimum, increases, becomes positive, and increases concavely
toward R.
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